Submitted on Briefs: February 12, 2014
District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. BDV-10-0011 Honorable Julie Macek, Presiding Judge
For Appellant: Kevin Mark Taylor, self-represented; Deer Lodge, Montana
For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General; Pamela P. Collins, Assistant Attorney General
John Parker, Cascade County Attorney
PATRICIA COTTER, Judge
¶1 Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Kevin Mark Taylor (Taylor) appeals from an order of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, denying his petition for postconviction relief. We affirm.
¶3 A restatement of the dispositive issue on appeal is:
¶4 Did the District Court err in denying Taylor's petition for postconviction relief?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶5 In May 2009, Taylor pleaded guilty to nonsupport, a felony, in violation of § 45-5-621, MCA. The District Court sentenced Taylor to two years with the Department of Corrections to run concurrently with any other sentence he was serving. Taylor filed a petition for postconviction relief on January 6, 2010, alleging that he was entitled to relief upon the following claims: prosecutorial misconduct, vindictive prosecution, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The District Court issued an order denying Taylor's petition for postconviction relief on July 16, 2013. The District Court dismissed Taylor's claims because "[t]he record indicated that the Petitioner voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights and pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, " thereby "waiv[ing] any claims that arose prior to entry of his or her plea, including factual issues, defenses, or constitutional claims." The court further concluded that each claim failed on its merits.
¶6 Taylor timely appealed. Taylor argues that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not barred because the waiver of his rights was unknowing and involuntary. Taylor contends that: (1) the State should have exhausted the administrative remedies outlined in § 40-5-162(2)(a)-(k), MCA, before charging him; (2) the County Attorney was not authorized to unilaterally enforce the support order without a specific petition; (3) and the State had no jurisdiction to charge him because the felony occurred in Wyoming.
¶7 The State counters that Taylor waived his claims when he voluntarily entered a plea of guilty, and that, further, he should have raised these claims on direct appeal instead of in a petition for postconviction relief. The State argues that if we reach the merits of his claims we should affirm the District Court because Taylor fails to establish that his counsel's performance was deficient. The State points out that Taylor raises the jurisdictional ...