United States District Court, D. Montana, Missoula Division
ORDER, AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Jeremiah C. Lynch, United States Magistrate Judge
Introduction and In Forma Pauperis Application
Kermit Poulson filed a pleading in this matter, together with
his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
may grant a litigant leave to proceed in forma pauperis if
the applicant's affidavit sufficiently indicates that the
applicant cannot pay court costs and still provide the
necessities of life for himself and his family. Adkins v.
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948).
It is well established that the district court has discretion
in determining whether a litigant is entitled to proceed in
forma pauperis. Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 600
(9th Cir. 1963).
Court finds Poulson's motion is incomplete. In paragraph
6 of Plaintiff's motion Poulson stated he receives
disability or workers compensation benefits. But he failed to
specifically describe each source of that income, the amount
he receives, the frequency with which he receives the income,
and whether he expects to continue to receive it. (Doc. 1 at
2.) Therefore, Poulson has failed to provide the Court
sufficient information to enable it to properly rule upon his
“[a] district court may deny leave to proceed in forma
pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the
proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without
merit.” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d
1113, 1115 (9thCir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370
(9thCir. 1987)). Therefore, the Court will first
consider whether Poulson's pleading has merit, or whether
it is frivolous and subject to dismissal.
alleges Defendants refused to fill a medical prescription he
presented to them. He states Defendants “fired”
him as a customer because he is bi-polar, they cannot bill
medicaid for his prescription, and they felt Poulson was
threatening them. But Poulson asserts he was merely standing
up for his “ADA, title II Anti-Discr. Rights[.]”
(Doc. 2 at 6.) He alleges Defendants are liable for violating
“Title II, 42 U.S.C. 1997(d)(e) [sic][, ]
14th Amendment, Discrimination, Libel, Slander,
[and] Defamation.” (Id.)
January 25, 2017, Poulson filed an amended complaint. In it
he adds that Defendants violated Mont. Code Ann. §
30-14-101 and “state business contracts.” (Doc.
Poulson is proceeding pro se the Court must construe his
pleading liberally, and the pleading is held “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972). See also Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). In view of the required liberal
a district court should grant leave to amend even if no
request to amend the pleading was made, unless it
determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by
the allegation of other facts.
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th
Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (quoting Doe v. United
States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)).
considering Poulson's in forma pauperis request, the
Court has authority to deny the request if the
plaintiff's proposed complaint is frivolous or without
merit. Minetti, 152 F.3d at 1115. The court retains
discretion in determining whether a complaint ...