of supervisory control, Chuck Devlin petitions this Court for
relief, challenging his 2006 criminal proceedings and
subsequent convictions arising in the Lake County District
Court under Cause Nos. DC-06-92 and DC-06-116. Devlin
contends that District Court Judge Kim Christopher
"intentionally collaborated] with other Justice
Officials to cover-up the controlling law of the case in
DC-06-92, and falsely appl[ied] the law in DC-06-116."
He requests supervisory control pursuant to M. R. App. P. 14
for this Court to "assume jurisdiction and appoint an
un-biased Judge [to] allow the cause DV 17-45 to continue
unhindered[.]" He also moves for appointment of counsel,
and for leave to file a copy of a June 23, 2017 District
Court Order which denied all of his motions regarding the
Court is familiar with Devlin and his criminal proceedings.
Devlin has two 2007 convictions from the Lake County District
Court. After a jury trial found him guilty, the District
Court sentenced Devlin as a persistent felony offender (PFO)
to fifty years in prison for kidnapping and obstruction of a
peace officer, with no parole eligibility for twenty-five
years. In his other proceeding, Devlin pled guilty to bail
jumping, and the court sentenced him as a PFO to a
twenty-year concurrent term, with fifteen years suspended. He
appealed both convictions to this Court. See State v.
Devlin, No. DA 07-0760, 2009 MT 18, 349 Mont. 67, 201
P.3d 791 (Devlin I), and State v. Devlin,
No. DA 07-0761, 2009 MT 55N, 2009 Mont. LEXIS 64 (Devlin
II). This Court affirmed the District Court in the first
appeal and affirmed the District Court in the second appeal
on all but one issue.
2010, Devlin appeared as a self-represented litigant, and
appealed the Lake County District Court's Order, which
denied his petition for postconviction relief. Devlin v.
State, No. DA 10-0554, 2011 MT 120N, 361 Mont. 536, 264
P.3d 518 (Devlin III). This Court affirmed the
District Court's decision. Devlin III,
¶¶ 2, 12. We explained, as the District Court had,
that his petition "does not comply with §
46-21-104, MCA[, ]" and Devlin "failed to meet his
burden of proof. . . ." Devlin III, ¶ 11.
sought habeas corpus relief with this Court in 2013.
Devlin v. Kirkegard, No. OP 13-0773, 2013 Mont.
LEXIS 572, 2013 WL 6912032 (Dec. 3, 2013) (Devlin
IV). We denied his petition and his motion for
appointment of counsel, explaining: "This Court does not
consider record-based issues in the context of a habeas
corpus proceeding." Devlin IV, *3-*4. We also
stated that because Devlin had exhausted his remedy of
appeal, he is procedurally barred from such relief. Section
a month, Devlin petitioned this Court for an out-of-time
appeal "in which he assert[ed] that he has discovered
new evidence that was not available at the time of his trial
or appeal which will establish his actual innocence."
Devlin v. State, No. DA 13-0865, 2014 Mont. LEXIS
790, *1 (Jan. 14, 2014) (Devlin V). We denied his
petition, pointing out that he raised no new evidence or
established any extraordinary circumstances under M. R. App.
P 4(6). We noted: "Assuming Devlin had a legitimate
issue arising from failure to allow his presence at the
omnibus hearing, he could have raised this issue on
appeal." Devlin V, *2.
January 2015, Devlin petitioned this Court for supervisory
control over the Lake County District Court "under M. R.
App. P. 14 and in the interest of justice." Devlin
v. Mont. Twentieth Judicial Dist. Ct, No. OP 15-0011,
278 Mont. 538, 348 P.3d 670, 2015 Mont. LEXIS 119, *1 (table)
(Jan. 20, 2015) (Devlin VI). He asserted claims that
he had new evidence showing "that [his] original charges
and conviction[s] were obtained under a Mistake of Law and is
causing a gross miscarriage of justice." Devlin
VI, *2. We denied his petition along with his motions to
set aside judgment, to dismiss, and for an evidentiary
hearing. Devlin VI, *3-*4.
then appealed the Lake County District Court's denial of
his second petition for postconviction relief. Devlin v.
State, No. DA 15-0159, 2015 MT 295N, 382 Mont. 407, 363
P.3d 1145 (Oct. 13, 2015) (Devlin VII). We affirmed
the District Court's conclusion "that it was
procedurally barred under multiple criminal procedure
statutes applicable to post-conviction proceedings, including
§§ 46-21-102, -104, and -105, MCA." Devlin
VII, ¶ 5.
instant petition is another attempt to attack his convictions
collaterally. This Court has told Devlin before that he has
exhausted his habeas corpus remedy because he appealed both
of his 2007 convictions. Devlin IV, *4. He sought
postconviction relief in the District Court twice, which the
court denied. He appealed both decisions, and we affirmed the
District Court's denials. Devlin III and
Devlin VII. Devlin also presents similar arguments
as he has before. He contends his convictions are wrongful
and that his incarceration is illegal. Devlin IV,
*2; Devlin VI, *4; Devlin VII, ¶ 6. He
claims that he has new evidence, which we have pointed out
before is not new. Devlin VII, ¶¶ 6, 8. He
alleges bias of the presiding judge who refuses "to
recuse herself and requests her disqualification, which we
have previously denied.
down, the relief Devlin seeks is a different outcome of his
2007 convictions. In early 2017, Devlin filed a civil
complaint in the Lake County District Court "per the
Habeas Doctrine." He claims "wrongful conviction,
illegal incarceration  and" requests an immediate
hearing concerning his allegations of fraud. A writ of
supervisory control is not the vehicle to reach such result.
As we have stated before, "Devlin has not met the
threshold for this Court to exercise supervisory control in
the District Court." Devlin VI, *2. At a minimum, he
must show that the District Court is proceeding under a
mistake of law, causing a gross injustice. Redding v.
Mont. First Judicial Dist. Ct, 2012 MT 144A, ¶ 18,
365 Mont. 316, 281 P.3d 189. He has not done so. Instead, he
seeks this Court's control over a matter because it is
not proceeding in a manner he wants. Supervisory control is
not warranted, and neither are persistent pleadings
concerning his 2007 convictions.
Montana's statutes, the right to seek postconviction
relief is not a right that persists ad infinitum. "In
short, a conviction becomes final when a defendant's
appellate remedies expire or are exhausted."
Peterson v. State, 2017 MT 165, ¶ 8, 2017 Mont.
LEXIS 359. Devlin has exhausted all of his remedies, and his
convictions are final. The doctrine of res judicata bars
further claims concerning his criminal convictions. "The
policy rationales underlying res judicata are judicial
economy and the need for finality of judgments."
State v. Southwick, 2007 MT 257, ¶ 15, 339
Mont. 281, 169 P.3d 698. An endpoint is warranted. Therefore,
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The petition for a writ of supervisory control is DENIED;
2. The motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED, as moot;
3. The motion for leave to submit recent Court Order and
Response Affidavit is DENIED; and
4. Henceforth, prior to filing any original petition, appeal,
or pleading with this Court regarding his 2007 convictions
and sentences, Devlin is directed to file a motion for leave
to file the document. The motion must be sworn under oath
before a notary public, not exceed three pages in length, and
make a preliminary showing that the motion has merit. Only
when this Court has reviewed the motion and issued an order
granting leave to file may the Clerk of Court file ...