as a self-represented litigant, Joseph Sean Walker petitions
this Court for habeas corpus relief, alleging constitutional
and Brady violations pertaining to his conviction
and sentence. We amend the caption to include the
Warden's name of the Crossroads Correctional Center,
Shelby, Montana. Section 46-22-20 l(1)(c), MCA.
December 2010, Walker pleaded guilty to felony sexual assault
in exchange for the dismissal of one count of felony
incest. On January 21, 2011, the Flathead County
District Court sentenced Walker to fifty years with a parole
eligibility restriction of twenty-five years. The court
designated him a Level II sex offender and ordered him to
complete sex offender treatment. Walker did not appeal.
did seek various forms of relief with this Court. In 2012, he
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising an
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) and several
constitutional claims. We denied his petition and noted other
remedies Walker could have pursued, such as filing in the
District Court either a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or
a petition for postconviction relief for his IAC claim.
Walker v. Frink, No. OP 12-0757, Or. (Mont. Jan. 16,
2013, Walker sought an out-of-time appeal of his conviction,
claiming that he had wanted to appeal and "that he and
his counsel disagreed upon strategy." State v.
Walker, No. DA 13-0380, Or. (Mont. Jul. 10, 2013). We
denied his petition because Walker did not identify any
issues preserved for appeal.
2014, Walker filed another petition for habeas corpus relief,
challenging the parole and probation conditions. We observed
that "Walker challenges the conditions set forth on
pages 3-13 of the Amended Judgment and Sentence; however, he
does not challenge his parole restriction; the order of sex
offender treatment; or the imposition of fines, fees,
restitution and restrictions upon his future employment and
residence, and restrictions on association with the victim or
other minors." Walker v. State, No. OP 14-0031,
Or. (Mont. Mar. 4, 2014). The Attorney General's response
conceded that the challenged parole conditions should be
treated as recommendations to the Board of Pardons and Parole
(Board). We remanded the matter to the District Court to
strike the illegal parole conditions. On March 21, 2014, the
Flathead County District Court issued a second Amended
Judgment and Sentence, in which it revised the parole
conditions as recommendations to the Board.
instant petition, Walker raises three issues concerning the
prosecution, conviction, and IAC. He questions whether the
prosecution and law enforcement caused a Brady
violation "when they completely refused to produce any
and all recorded interrogation of Walker[.]" He asserts
that the District Court erred when it imposed a parole
eligibility restriction in light of § 46-18-222, MCA,
because it dismissed the incest charge, pursuant to §
45-5-507, MCA. Lastly, he puts forth a claim of IAC because
his counsel "wholly failed" to raise or to address
these two issues. He asserts that he is entitled to immediate
argument concerning the parole eligibility restriction fails
for two reasons. First, even though the District Court
dismissed the incest charge, Walker pleaded guilty to sexual
assault, specifically, § 45-5-502(3), MCA. Pursuant to
§ 46-18-222(6), MCA, a court may impose a parole
eligibility restriction for sexual assault or incest. Second,
this Court has rejected similar arguments. We have held that
§ 46-18-202(2), MCA, authorizes a sentencing court to
impose parole eligibility restrictions when imposing a prison
term that exceeds one year. State v. Kirkbride, 2008
MT 178, ¶¶ 16-21, 343 Mont. 409, 185 P.3d 340 and
State v. Burch, 2008 MT 118, ¶ 26. 342 Mont.
499, 182 P.3d 66. See also State v. Bullman, 2009 MT
3 7, ¶ 34, 349 Mont. 228, 203 P.3d 768 (a sentencing
court may impose a parole eligibility restriction of
completion of phases I and II of the sex offender treatment
program at the Montana State Prison.). Walker cites to §
46-23-509, MCA, which refers to registration of sexual
offenders under probation and parole, and does not apply to
sentencing courts. Burch, ¶ 27.
to the other issues, we remind Walker that he pleaded guilty
to the offense. When he entered into the plea agreement, he
waived any constitutional challenges. "[A] defendant
waives the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional defects upon
voluntarily and knowingly entering a guilty plea, including
constitutional violations, which may have occurred prior to
the plea." State v. Pavey, 2010 MT 104, ¶
11, 356 Mont. 248, 231 P.3d 1104 (citing State v.
Violette, 2009 MT 19, ¶ 16, 349 Mont. 81, 201 P.3d
804.). His constitutional challenges thus fail.
is attempting to litigate his conviction and sentence. Habeas
corpus is not an alternative for a direct appeal. State
v. Wright, 2001 MT 282, ¶ 13, 307 Mont. 349, 42
P.3d 753. Walker is procedurally barred at this point from
raising additional claims. By not appealing his sentence, he
has exhausted his remedies, and he is precluded from raising
them in a petition for habeas corpus relief. Section
46-22-101(2), MCA; Lott v. State, 2006 MT 279,
¶ 19, 334 Mont. 270, 150 P.3d 337. He also did not
timely seek a petition for postconviction relief for his IAC
claim. Walker is now time-barred. Lott, ¶l%.
Walker has not demonstrated an illegal sentence.
THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is DENIED.
Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Order to counsel
of record, and to Joseph Sean Walker personally.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, (1963) (The United States
Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment, irrespective ...