United States District Court, D. Montana, Great Falls Division
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES
JOHNSTON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Keith Doyle, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, see
(Doc. 5), filed a Complaint alleging irregularities in his
state criminal proceedings. (Doc. 2). The Complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted and should be
Doyle is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis the Court
must review his Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § § 1915,
1915 A. Sections 1915 A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B) require the
Court to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis and/or
by a prisoner against a governmental defendant before it is
served if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
complaint is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint is malicious if not
pleaded in good faith. Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab.
Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46 (1915). A complaint fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted if a plaintiff fails
to allege the "grounds" of his "entitlement to
relief." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation omitted).
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
complaint "that states a claim for relief must contain
... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
[plaintiff] is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). In order to satisfy the requirements in Rule 8 a
complaint's allegations must cross "the line from
conceivable to plausible." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009). There is a two-step procedure to
determine whether a complaint's allegations cross that
line. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662. First, the Court must identify "the
allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the
assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679,
680. Factual allegations are not entitled to the assumption
of truth if they are "merely consistent with
liability," or "amount to nothing more than a
'formulaic recitation of the elements' of a
constitutional" claim. Id. at 679, 681. A
complaint stops short of the line between probability and the
possibility of relief where the facts pled are merely
consistent with a defendant's liability. Id. at
the Court must determine whether the complaint states a
"plausible" claim for relief. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679. A claim is "plausible" if the factual
allegations, which are accepted as true, "allow[ ] the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678.
This inquiry is "a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense." Id. at 679 (citation omitted).
If the factual allegations, which are accepted as true,
"do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it
has not "show[n]"-"that the pleader is
entitled to relief." Id. (citing Fed.R, Civ.P.
document filed pro se is 'to be liberally
construed,' and 'a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.' "
Erickson v. Pardu, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007);
cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(e) ("Pleadings must
be construed so as to do justice").
Doyle, along with Maurice Archer, John Chambers, Brian Smith,
and Charles Clary, joined in filing the complaint lodged in
this matter and sought certification to proceed as a class.
See Archer v. Fox et. al., CV-17-108-GF, (Docs. 6,
7, 8). The Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification and ordered that the claims be severed. See
generally Archer v. Fox et. al., CV-17-108-GF (Doc. 15);
see also (Doc. 3). Accordingly, separate cases were
opened for each of the named plaintiffs.
2005, Doyle was sentenced in Montana's Second Judicial
District, Butte-Silverbow County, for Accountability to
Deliberate Homicide in Cause No. DC-03-110. (Doc. 2 at
Doyle has previously challenged his 2005 conviction in this
Court via four separate federal habeas corpus petitions under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doyle's first petition was denied
on its merits. See Doyle v. O Fallon, No. CV
09-58-BU-RFC-CSO (D. Mont, judgment entered Mar. 16, 2010).
Doyle's second petition was dismissed in its entirety as
an unauthorized second petition. Doyle v. State, No.
CV 12-39-BU-DLC (D. Mont, judgment entered Oct. 16, 2012). In
his third petition Doyle challenged the validity of his 2005
conviction and argued in part, that the Montana state
charging process of prosecution by Information was
constitutionally infirm. This Court determined the claim was
frivolous and that such prosecution is consistent with the
federal guarantee of due process. See Doyle v.
Frink, No. CV-13-60-DWM-JCL, Mag. Or. & Find, at 3
(Aug. 7, 2013), citing Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 538 (1884). Doyle's third petition was
dismissed as an unauthorized successive petition. Doyle
v. Frink, No. CV-13-60-DWM-JCL (D. Mont, judgment
entered Sept. 30, 2013). Doyle's fourth petition was also
dismissed in its entirety as an unauthorized successive
habeas petition. Doyle v. Fender, No. CV
17-68-BU-DLC (D. Mont. judgment entered Nov. 29, 2017).
instant matter Doyle complains his state charges were brought
"under indictment by information" and that he was
deprived of deprived of either a "constitutionally
mandated preliminary examination before a magistrate" or
a "non-perfunctory adversarial hearing before the
district judge prior to being indicted by information on
judicial order to file the information as the instrument of
indictment." (Doc. 2 at 2). Doyle contends that other
similarly situated individuals, too numerous to number, have
had their due process rights violated by the purported faulty
charging manner utilized by the State of Montana and are also
entitled to justice. Id. at 4.
asserts Attorney General Timothy Fox, as the chief law
enforcement officer in the state, has been made aware of the
due process violations that have occurred as a result of the
unconstitutional charging practice, by virtue of numerous
appeals, post conviction matters, and state habeas petitions
that have been filed. Id. at 4-5. Doyle complains