United States District Court, D. Montana, Helena Division
L. CHRISTENSEN, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Adrian Guille is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and
without counsel. Pending are Defendants' Objection to
Magistrate Judge's Order granting Mr. Guille's Motion
to Compel (Doc. 127); Defendants' Motion for Protective
Order (Doc. 128); Non-IPS Team Defendants' Renewed Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. 133); Mr. Guille's Motion for
Sanctions for Failure to Comply with a Court Order in
Discovery (Doc. 142); Defendants' Motion to Strike Mr.
Guille's Second Response to Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 143); Mr. Guille's Motion to Stay (Doc. 146); Mr.
Guille's Motion for Leave to File his Sur-Reply Brief in
Response to Defendants' Reply Brief in Support of their
Motion to Strike (Doc. 151); Mr. Guille's Motion to
Compel Discovery (Doc. 153); Mr. Guille's Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 156); Mr. Guille's Motion in
Limine to Exclude his Prior Institutional and Criminal
Records from Trial (Doc. 159); Defendants' Motion to
Strike Mr. Guille's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
161); and Defendants' Motion to Strike Mr. Guille's
Motion in Limine (Doc. 162).
Court finds Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
dispositive of most of the pending issues and will therefore
address that motion first.
Non-IPS Team Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
judgment is appropriate when the moving party "shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under summary judgment practice,
"[t]he moving party initially bears the burden of
proving the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact." In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d
376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S.317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may
accomplish this by "citing to particular parts of
materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes
of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials" or by showing that such materials
"do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute, or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible
evidence to support the fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A),
the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the
moving party need only prove that there is an absence of
evidence to support the non-moving party's case."
Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Summary judgment should be entered,
"after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial." See Celotex, 477
U.S. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning
an essential element of the nonmoving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."
Id. at 323. In such a circumstance, summary judgment
should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the
district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of
summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is
moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden
then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). In attempting to establish the
existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not
rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is
required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of
affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support
of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.l
1. But "[a] plaintiffs verified complaint may be
considered as an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment
if it is based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific
facts admissible in evidence." Lopez v. Smith,
203 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.l4 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The
opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention
is material, i.e., a fact "that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law, " and that the
dispute is genuine, i.e., "the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S.242, 248 (1986); T. W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac.
Elec. Contractors Ass 'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th
evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a
genuine issue of fact, " the court draws "all
inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the
non-moving party." Walls v. Cent. Costa Cnty.
Transit Auth., 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). It is
the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual
predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See
Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902
(9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the
opposing party "must do more than simply show that there
is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations omitted).
contemporaneous notice provided October 6, 2017 (Doc. 136),
Mr. Guille was advised of the requirements for opposing a
motion brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952,
957 (9th Cir. 1998)(en banc); Klingele v.
Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).
Guille has alleged the Non-IPS Team Defendants failed to
supervise and/or take disciplinary action to curb a known
pattern of physical abuse to inmates by Defendants Sweeney,
Short, Trudeau, Kent and Segovia (hereinafter "IPS Team
Defendants"). He alleges this constituted deliberate
indifference to his safety and proximately caused a violation
of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Amd. Cmplt, Doc. 32 at
individual can be held liable in their individual capacity
under a theory of supervisory liability. "[A] plaintiff
may state a claim against a supervisor for deliberate
indifference based upon the supervisor's knowledge of and
acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his or her
subordinates." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202
(9th Cir. 2011). Section 1983 will not impose liability on
supervising officers under a respondeat superior theory of
liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-94. That is, a
defendant cannot be held liable just because they supervise
other employees. Instead, supervising officers can be held
liable under § 1983 "only if they play an
affirmative part in the alleged deprivation of constitutional
rights." King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th
Ninth Circuit has identified four general situations in which
supervisory liability may be imposed: (1) for setting in
motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refusing to
terminate a series of acts by others, which they knew or
reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict
constitutional injury; (2) for culpable action or inaction in
training, supervision, or control of subordinates; (3) for
acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation by
subordinates; or (4) for ...