United States District Court, D. Montana, Missoula Division
WILLIAM F. TREBAS, JR., Plaintiff,
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, ALLY BANK, A UTAH CORPORATION, GMAC CAPITAL TRUST 1, and DOES 1 through 10 inclusive, Defendants.
ORDER, AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Jeremiah C. Lynch United States Magistrate Judge.
the Court is Defendant Ally Bank's Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 motion
for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed, the Court
recommends the motion be granted.
before the Court is Ally Bank's motion in limine. Because
the Court recommends this action be dismissed, the motion in
limine is denied as moot.
2012, Plaintiff William Trebas, Jr., appearing pro se in this
action, obtained a loan in the amount of $492, 000 from Guild
Mortgage Company (“Guild”). The loan was secured
by a deed of trust that Trebas granted to Guild which
encumbers real property he owns in Columbia Falls, Montana.
allegations Trebas recognizes the existence of a written
assignment to Ally Bank of the rights under the deed of
trust. But he claims the assignment only purports to transfer
those rights to Ally Bank.
point Trebas failed to make the required monthly payments on
the loan, and he defaulted on the loan. In 2017, a notice of
trustee sale was recorded, and on May 5, 2017, Ally Bank
acquired ownership of Trebas's property by purchasing it
at the trustee's sale.
commenced this civil action challenging Ally Bank's
factual and legal authority to claim, and to represent to
him, that it is the current beneficiary under the deed of
trust with the authority to direct the trustee's sale of
Trebas's property. Trebas asserts his original promissory
note was not indorsed, negotiated, and transferred to Ally
Bank. Thus, he contends that legally Ally Bank is not the
holder of the promissory note and is not the beneficiary
under the deed of trust.
Trebas's claims for relief advanced in his Amended
Complaint is predicated upon his contentions that Ally Bank
lacks the legal authority (1) to enforce rights as a
beneficiary under the deed of trust, including the power of
sale, (2) to enforce compliance with the promissory note, or
(3) to foreclose upon and acquire Trebas's real property.
In his first cause of action Trebas alleges that Ally Bank is
liable for fraud for falsely misrepresenting to him that it
is the beneficiary under the deed of trust and in possession
of all the beneficiary's associated rights and powers. In
his second cause of action Trebas asserts Ally Bank's
conduct violated provisions of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., through the
same allegedly deceptive misrepresentations to Trebas about
its legal rights, all in violation of 15 U.S.C. §
1692e(2)(A) and (10). Trebas's third and fourth causes of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
declaratory judgment similarly claim that Ally Bank
wrongfully represented to him that it was the beneficiary
under the deed of trust entitled to invoke the power of sale
rights, thereby causing damages to Trebas and requiring the
Court to declare the sale of his property to Ally Bank as
claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act invoke
the Court's federal question jurisdiction as provided in
28 U.S.C. § 1331. And pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
the Court possesses supplemental jurisdiction over
Trebas's claims advanced under Montana law.
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) entitles a party to summary
judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” In deciding a motion for
summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all
justifiable inferences in the non-moving party's favor.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986); Betz v. Trainer Wortham & Co.,
Inc., 504 F.3d 1017, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2007).