United States District Court, D. Montana, Helena Division
STACY G. HALL, Petitioner,
REGINALD MICHAEL, Respondent.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES
JOHNSTON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
case comes before the Court on Stacy G. Hall's Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Hall claims the State of Montana has violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, denying him due process of law, equal protection,
and fundamental fairness, by designating 4, 511 days as
"dead-time" in the calculation of his prison
sentences and discharge date. (Doc. 1 at 1; 3.) Hall
challenges: (1) the 4, 084 days of "dead-time"
awarded for the time period when he was on escape status, but
the State of Montana refused to pursue him under its
jurisdiction (id. at 2-3); (2) 717 days where Hall
had been erroneously released from custody, by no fault of
his own, after Texas officials rescinded Hall's arrest
warrant, (id. at 3); and, (3) the failure to credit
Hall with 594 days for time spent incarcerated in California
on a detainer requested by the Montana State Prison.
Id. Hall is a state prisoner proceeding pro se.
Factual and Procedural Background
Montana Supreme Court summarized Hall's procedural
history as follows:
Hall was found guilty and sentenced in January 1996 to a
collective forty-five years with five suspended, for
burglary, theft, and criminal mischief, to run concurrently
with sentences stemming from previous convictions. He was
sentenced in March 1996 for felony escape, for which he
received another three-year consecutive sentence. Later that
year, Hall was transported to the Dickens County Correctional
Center in Spur, Texas, due to overcrowding at Montana State
Prison (MSP). He escaped from the Dickens County facility
just over a month following his transfer. In May 2007, Santa
Clara County, California, authorities notified Montana
authorities of Hall's whereabouts. MSP Records promptly
began the process to return Hall to Montana. Hall served a
three-year sentence on a new California conviction and
returned to MSP on February 18, 2009.
Hall v. Michael, OP 17-0277, 2017 WL 9285599, Or. at
1 (Mont. Aug. 8, 2017).
petition at hand is Hall's third in this Court. He filed
the first in 2011. See Hall v. Law, No. CV
11-07-GF-SEH (D. Mont. judg. entered Feb 28, 2011). There
Hall argued, in essence, that he stopped being a fugitive
when Texas stopped looking for him, therefore the State of
Montana was estopped from returning him to prison. He also
challenged the extradition process utilized to effectuate his
return to MSP. The petition was dismissed with prejudice.
This Court observed, it was not "aware of any law that
could support Petitioner's claims. He is simply serving
the prison time he has owed the State of Montana since 1996.
An escapee does not ripen into a free person through the slow
accretion of year-to-year success in remaining at
large." Hall v. Law, No. CV 11-07-GF-SHE, Find.
& Rec. (Doc 4 at 3.)
February of 2012, Hall filed a second habeas petition
challenging disciplinary violations assessed against him
following a November 2010 assault on a fellow inmate. That
petition was dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Hall v. Kirkegard, No. CV 12-18-H-DLC
(D. Mont. judg. entered April 19, 2012).
outset, this Court attempted to discern if Hall's
petition is truly a habeas petition or, in reality, a motion
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek
relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of his
case, under a limited set of circumstances. Rule 60(b)
"has an unquestionably valid role to play in habeas
cases," but its application is qualified by the
stringent limitations on second or successive habeas
petitions. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 534
(2005); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), (2). Under
Gonzalez, a legitimate Rule 60(b) motion
"attacks ... some defect in the integrity of the federal
habeas proceedings," while a second or successive habeas
corpus petition "is a filing that contains one or more
'claims,' defined as asserted federal bases for
relief from a state court's judgment of conviction."
545 U.S. at 530, 532, 125 S.Ct. 2641. A motion that does not
attack "the integrity of the proceedings, but in effect
asks for a second chance to have the merits determined
favorably" raises a claim that takes it outside of the
bounds of Rule 60(b) and within the scope of the AEDPA's
limitations on second or successive habeas corpus petitions.
Id. at 532 n. 5, 125 S.Ct. 2641. Hall's petition
appears to fall squarely in the realm of second or successive
Court must dismiss any claim which was presented in a prior
habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). A new claim in
a second or successive petition must be dismissed even if not
presented in a prior habeas petition, unless the claim rests
on new law, new evidence, or Petitioner's actual
innocence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Even in the latter
circumstance, leave of the Court of Appeals is required to
maintain the successive petition. 28 U.S.C. §
claims that Hall attempts to advance in his current petition
arise out of the re-calculation of his sentence that was
performed in 2009 following his return to the Montana State
Prison from California. Since the filing of his first habeas
petition with this Court in 2011, there has been no amended
judgment, no revocation, nor any intervening proceedings that
have altered MSP's 2009 calculation of "dead
time." Further, a review of Hall's 2011 habeas case
reveals he was well aware of this "dead time"
calculation at the time he filed his petition. See e.g.
Hall v. Law, No. CV 11-07-GF-SHE, Ex. (Doc. l-25)(March
12, 2009 MSP record calculating dead time while Hall on
escape and advising Hall of his updated parole eligibility
and discharge dates); see also (Doc. 1-26 at 7).
continues to challenge to 2009 calculation of'dead
time" imposed upon his sentence. Hall had the full
opportunity to challenge this sentence in his prior federal
habeas petition. See, Magwoodv. Patterson, 561 U.S.
320, 332-3 (2010); Hill v. State of Alaska, 297 F.3d
895, 897-898 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, the pending
petition is a successive attack on the 2009 sentence
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) sets forth narrow exceptions to the
second or successive bar. The exceptions are limited to new
rules of constitutional law, § 2244(b)(2)(A), or newly
discovered facts that establish actual innocence, §
2244(b)(2)(B). Even if Hall were able to establish a valid
exception, these may not be asserted for the first time in
the district court. Hall is required to raise his grounds for
making a second or successive petition before the Ninth
Circuit, in a motion for leave to file a second or successive
petition. "Before a second or successive application
permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the
applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for
an order authorizing the district court to consider the
application." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Until Hall