United States District Court, D. Montana, Missoula Division
CHARLES E. THEIS, Plaintiff,
CAPTAIN JOEL T. SHEARER and PROVIDENCE ST. JOSEPH MEDICAL CENTER, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Jeremiah C. Lynch United States Magistrate Judge.
the Court are Defendant Providence St. Joseph Medical
Center's (“Providence”) Fed.R.Civ.P. 56
motion for summary judgment, and Defendant Joel Shearer's
(“Shearer”) separate Rule 56 motion for summary
judgment. Despite the extension of time the Court granted
Plaintiff Charles Theis, appearing pro se, he has failed to
file responses to the referenced motions. For the reasons
discussed, the Court recommends the summary judgment motions
action has its genesis in events that allegedly occurred when
Theis was incarcerated at the Lake County Detention Center in
2017. Shearer is a Captain employed at the detention center.
Providence operates a health care facility, and it provides
health care for individuals incarcerated at the detention
center. Providence employs Lou Brenner, a physician's
assistant, to provide medical treatment to those inmates.
Theis asserts he was deprived of adequate medical care during
his incarceration in violation of his federal constitutional
rights. Specifically, he alleges Shearer and Providence
failed to provide him adequate medical care for a broken
foot, an abscessed tooth, and broken teeth. He also alleges
he experienced skin and respiratory problems due to mold at
further alleges his constitutional rights were violated in
July, 2017, when correctional officers forced him, and other
inmates, to crawl on their hands and knees at gun point.
Finally, he advances a claim alleging Defendants are liable
for negligence under Montana law.
federal claims invoke the Court's subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. And the Court
possesses supplemental jurisdiction over his negligence
claims advanced under Montana law as provided by 28 U.S.C.
Motion for Summary Judgment
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) entitles a party to summary
judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” In deciding a motion for
summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all
justifiable inferences in the non-moving party's favor.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986); Betz v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 504
F.3d 1017, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2007).
the moving party has satisfied its burden, the non-moving
party must go beyond the pleadings and designate by
affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
admissions on file, “specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v.
Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). A party opposing
summary judgment must identify evidence establishing that a
dispute as to a particular material fact is genuine.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
failure to respond to the summary judgment motions does not,
by itself, provide the Court with authority to grant the
motions. See Evans v. Independent Order of
Foresters, 141 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 1998).
Rather, the Court is independently obligated to
“carefully evaluate” whether there exist
genuine issues of material facts which would preclude summary
judgment. See Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488,
1495 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994). Even in the absence of a
response from the non-moving party, the moving party still
bears the burden of demonstrating its entitlement to judgment
as a matter of law. Id. Nonetheless, a court can
grant an unopposed summary judgment motion if the
movant's papers do not reveal a genuine issue of material
fact, and are themselves sufficient to warrant summary
judgment. United States v. Real Property Located at
Incline Village, 47 F.3d 1511, 1520 ((9th
Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds sub nom, Degen v.
United States, 517 U.S. 820 (1996).
Pro Se Pleadings
Theis is proceeding pro se the Court must construe his
pleading liberally, and “however inartfully pleaded,
[it] must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted).
See also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9
(1989). With respect to Defendants' summary judgment
motions, the Court must afford ...