United States District Court, D. Montana, Missoula Division
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
JEREMIAH C. LYNCH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
27, 2018, Tyrone Everett Payne filed a petition seeking a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Payne is a
state prisoner proceeding pro se. His sentence expired on
October 5, 2018.
alleges that his right to due process, as outlined under
Gagnon v. Scarpell, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) and
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), was
repeatedly violated during his revocation proceedings in the
Montana state district court. (Doc. 1 at 4, ¶ 13(A); 5,
¶ 13(B); 7; 8-10). First, Payne alleges the evidence
presented at his evidentiary hearing did not support a
finding of revocation by a preponderance of the evidence.
(Doc. 1 at 4, ¶ 13(A); 5, ¶ 13(B)). Next, Payne
asserts the district court erroneously admitted hearsay
testimony from Payne's supervising officer. Id.
at 8-10. Finally, Payne alleges he was not provided adequate
notice in order to prepare a defense prior to his revocation
hearing, also in violation of his right to due process.
Id. at 7.
Montana Supreme Court summarized Payne's procedural
history as follows:
On January 6, 2014, Payne entered an "Alford" plea
for Failure to Give Notice of Change of Address by a Sexual
or Violent Offender. The District Court then sentenced him to
the Montana State Prison for three years, with credit for 147
days served and the remainder to be suspended and
unsupervised probation. On March 14, 2014, the State filed
its first Petition to Revoke alleging Payne violated his
terms of probation. The District Court revoked Payne's
sentence and re-imposed the fully suspended three-year term
to Montana State Prison with credit for 156 days served, but
required supervised probation. On September 18, 2015, the
State filed a second Petition to Revoke based on probation
violations. The District Court once again revoked Payne's
probation, imposed a three-year suspended sentence, and
ordered all previous conditions re-imposed. On August 25,
2016, the State filed its third Petition to Revoke based on
new probation violations which included indecent exposure,
methamphetamine use, and failure to report to probation
officers. On September 28, 2016, the District Court held an
evidentiary hearing. The District Court found Payne in
violation of conditions #5 (failing to check in with
probation officer), #9 (laws and conduct), and #10 (admission
of methamphetamine use). The District Court determined the
State failed to prove alleged violation under condition #13
(failure to obtain chemical dependency evaluation). On
October 4, 2016, in open court, the District Court revoked
Payne's sentence and sentenced him to three years in
Montana State Prison with no time suspended and credited him
for 364 days in custody. The District Court issued its order
setting forth Payne's sentence on October 20, 2016.
State v. Payne, 2018 MT 147N, Mem. Op., ¶ 3
(Mont. June 12, 2018).
filed a direct appeal following the revocation of his
sentence, advancing due process claims similar to those
raised in his federal petition. Payne's sentence was
forth above, all of the claims that Payne raises in the
instant petition stem from the events leading to the 2016
revocation of his suspended sentence. Payne has now served
out the entirety of his sentence and is under no form of
supervision. See, (Doc. 4.) Payne's petition
should be denied in its entirety as moot.
III, § 2 of the United States Constitution requires a
"case or controversy" for justiciability, meaning
that an injury-in-fact has occurred. Throughout litigation an
individual "must have suffered, or be threatened with,
an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Lewis
v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990).
When an individual is incarcerated, a challenge to the
validity of his conviction satisfies the case-or-controversy
requirement: the ongoing incarceration constitutes a concrete
injury and it is redressable by invalidation of the
conviction. See, Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7
(1998). The Supreme Court has recognized that when
challenging the conviction itself, the existence of
collateral consequences sufficient to satisfy the
case-or-controversy requirement is presumed. Id. at
8, citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-8
(1968). Examples of such consequences include making one:
liable to deportation, ineligible for naturalization, unable
to serve on a jury, unable to vote, or unable to hold office.
See, Fiswickv. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 221-223
(1946). This presumption is justified because it is an
"obvious fact of life that most criminal convictions do
in fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences."
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55-6(1968).
analysis changes, however, once an individual has completed
his sentence. In Spencer v. Kemna, the Court found
that the same adverse legal consequences present for a
criminal conviction were not found in parole revocation
proceedings. In the revocation context, the Court held that
without proof of ongoing collateral consequences from that
revocation, an unconditional release from custody moots a
defendant's challenge to his allegedly erroneous
revocation. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8-16
Spencer did not challenge his felony convictions, but rather
the lawfulness of the termination of his parole status. At
the time of the Court's decision, Spencer's
reincarceration was over and could not "be undone."
Id. at 8. Consequently, the Court declined to extend
the presumption of collateral consequences that attach to
criminal convictions in the revocation context, concluding
that in what would otherwise be a moot case, a case or
controversy exists only if the parties continue to have
"a personal stake in the outcome," such that
"an actual injury [is] traceable to the defendant and
[is] likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.
Id., at 7. For a defendant who already has served
his sentence, "some continuing injury other than the
now-ended incarceration or parole- some 'collateral
consequence' of the conviction- must exist if the suit is
to be maintained." Id. Unlike a criminal
conviction, "[n]o civil disabilities... result from a
finding that an individual has violated his parole."
Id. at 12, (quoting Lane v. Williams, 455
U.S. 624, 632 (1982)). Spencer was unable to establish
adequate collateral consequences.
to Spencer, the Ninth Circuit held that a sentence
could be challenged, even if it has been completely served,
if there might be "'collateral consequences for a
defendant in any possible future sentencing." United
States v. Schmidt,99 F.3d 315, 317 (9th Cir.
1996); United States v. Dickey,924 F.2d 836, 838
(9th Cir. 1991). But in light of Spencer,
the Circuit overruled prior precedent, holding that
collateral consequences cannot be presumed where a defendant
has already served his entire sentence. United States v.