United States District Court, D. Montana, Butte Division
JEREMIAH C. LYNCH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
William Nordholm brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against Defendant Anaconda-Deer Lodge County and that
entity's law enforcement officers Tim Barkell, Bill
Sather, Richard Pasha, Mark Durkin, and Brandon Staley,
alleging they violated the rights secured him by the First,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. Nordholm seeks injunctive and declaratory
relief as well as monetary compensation.
advances three claims for relief: Count I asserts a due
process violation resulting from the policy of Anaconda-Deer
Lodge County (“ADLC”) charging pretrial detainees
“bonding”/“holding” fees. Count II
asserts a due process violation stemming from an alleged
conspiracy on the part of Pasha - and an unknown officer - to
file false criminal charges against Nordholm. Finally, Count
III advances a claim against various ADLC detention officers
for allegedly violating his First Amendment rights by failing
to provide him with grievance forms, failing to respond to
his grievances and medical requests, and failing to forward
the Court is Defendants' consolidated motion for partial
summary judgment seeking dismissal of Count I on the ground
that Nordholm has failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies purportedly available as required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a). Defendants also allege those aspects of
Count I seeking declaratory and injunctive relief are moot
because Nordholm is no longer incarcerated at ADLC. Nordholm
opposes Defendants' motion.
lists three separate instances in which he allegedly incurred
fees as a pretrial detainee at ADLC and before being released
on bond. Nordholm complains that on each instance he was
charged a “booking” and “bonding”
fee. Nordholm challenges the constitutional validity of the
fees, emphasizing he was never provided notice or hearing to
contest the fees.
admit to charging Nordholm $285 for “booking and
holding fees.” (Doc. 37 at 2.) In this regard, ADLC
admits it received $23 directly from Nordholm. But with
respect to the remaining $262 of the fees, ADLC simply
states, without explanation, that amount was paid by a
bonding company. (Doc. 37-22.)
reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion for partial
summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is denied. Defendant's motion asserting
Nordholm's claims are moot is denied with respect to his
claim for declaratory relief, but granted as to his claim for
judgment is to be granted only when there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Because
Nordholm is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe his
documents liberally and give them “the benefit of the
doubt” with respect to Defendants' motion for
partial summary judgment. Frost v. Symington, 197
F.3d 348, 352 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
moving party makes a prima facie showing that summary
judgment is appropriate, the burden shifts to the opposing
party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986); Betz v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc.,
504 F.3d 1017, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2007). On summary judgment,
all inferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 255.
Exhaustion of ...