Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Guille v. Sweeney

United States District Court, D. Montana, Helena Division

November 7, 2018

ADRIAN GUILLE, Plaintiff,
v.
JOSH SWEENEY, SAMUEL SHORT, JASON TRUDEAU, GARRETT KENT, and DANIEL SEGOVIA, Defendants.

          ORDER

          Dana L. Christensen, Chief Judge

         Pending are Plaintiff Adrian Guille's Motion in Limine (Doc. 159), Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 169), a document entitled "Plaintiffs Objections to the Use of Chief Judge Presiding over Trial, Pre-trial Proceedings Due to Conflict of Interest, Bias Against Plaintiff (Doc. 170) which has been construed as a motion to recuse, and two Motions for Writs of Habeas Corpus ad Testificandum (Docs. 171, 176). Defendants filed a response to Mr. Guille's motions for writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum but did not respond to the motion for reconsideration or the motion for recusal. Nevertheless, Mr. Guille's motions will be denied.

         I. Motion in Limine (Doc. 159)

         In his motion in limine, Mr. Guille seeks to exclude his prior institutional and criminal records from trial. (Doc. 159.) He argues this evidence would be irrelevant if the named Defendants were not aware of his prior record, that the probative value of this evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and that prior convictions are generally used only to impeach the credibility of a party or witness. (Docs. 159, 160.)

         "Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court's inherent authority to manage the course of trials." Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n. 2 (1984). But the Court "is almost always better situated during the actual trial to assess the value and utility of evidence." Wilkins v. Kmart Corp., 487 F.Supp.2d 1216, 1218 (D. Kan. 2007). The Sixth Circuit has explained that, "a better practice is to deal with questions of admissibility of evidence as they arise [in trial]" as opposed to ruling on a motion in limine. Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975).

         The Court will not make a general ruling regarding the admissibility Mr. Guille's institutional history and/or criminal history because there has been no indication what if any of this evidence Defendants intend to seek to introduce at trial. Any information Defendants were aware of on the date of the incident regarding Mr. Guille's criminal and institutional history may be relevant to Defendants' defenses in this case but the Court cannot make that determination in the abstract.

         The motion in limine will be denied without prejudice and subject to renewal at the Court's Final Pretrial Conference and at trial.

         II. Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 169)

         Mr. Guille moves for reconsideration of the Court's June 18, 2018 Order granting the supervisory Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 169.) Local Rule 7.3 provides as follows:

(b) Form and Content of Motion for Leave. A motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration may seek reconsideration only of an interlocutory order, must be limited to 2, 275 words or, for pro se litigants, seven pages, and must specify why it meets at least one of the following:
(1) (A) the facts or applicable law are materially different from the facts or applicable law that the parties presented to the court before entry of the order for which reconsideration is sought, and (B) despite the exercise of reasonable diligence, the party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or law before entry of the order; or
(2) new material facts arose or a change of law occurred after entry of the order.
(c) Prohibition Against Repetition of Argument. No motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order may repeat any oral or written argument made by the applying party before entry of the order. Violation of this restriction subjects the offending party to appropriate sanctions.

         Mr. Guille raises twelve arguments in support of his motion for reconsideration but does not establish that the facts or applicable law are materially different from the facts or law presented in his previous filings prior to entry of the Order granting summary judgment. For the most part, Mr. Guille raises arguments and contentions that were already presented to the Court before it granted the supervisory Defendants' motion for summary judgment. There are however, two issues the Court must address: (1) Mr. Guille's contention that he was not provided a copy of the Court's Local Rules and (2) his contention that he did not receive notice of the summary judgment rules as required by Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 960-61 (9th Cir. 1998).

         A. Local Rules

         Mr. Guille contends he requested but was not provided with a copy of the Court's Local Rules. (Motion for Reconsideration, Doc. 169 at 1.) He argues that the Local Rules require a statement of undisputed facts but the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not have such a requirement. He contends he was not provided a copy of the Local Rules and therefore could not have known of this requirement in order to move to strike Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment for failing to file a statement of undisputed facts. (Doc. 169 at 2; see also Point #1, Doc. 169 at 2; Argument #5, Doc. 169-2 at 2; Doc. 170 at 1-2.) But Defendants filed both a Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc. 59) and a Supplemental Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc. 135). As such, this is not a sufficient grounds to reconsider the decision to grant the Supervisory Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.[1]

         B. Rand Notice

         In his "Objections to Judge's Granting of Partial Summary Judgment for the Defendants," Mr. Guille contends he was not given a notice required by Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 960-61 (9th Cir. 1998). (Doc. 169-3 at 1.) In Rand, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a pro se prisoner is entitled to fair notice of the requirements of the summary judgment rule. Rand, 154 F.3d 952. According to the record, Defendants served a Notice and Warning to Plaintiff on Mr. Guille on October 6, 2017 contemporaneously with the supervisory Defendants'renewed motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 136.) In addition, Defendants indicated in their renewed motion for summary judgment that they had filed a Rand Notice and Warning to Plaintiff as required under L.R. 56.2. (Doc. 133, at 2.) Mr. Guille obviously received Defendants' motion because he filed two responses to the motion. (Docs. 137, 141.) Prior to his motion for reconsideration, Mr. Guille never raised the issue of not having received a Rand notice. The Court finds that the record establishes that he did in fact receive a Rand notice.

         Generally, a failure to give adequate notice is reversible error and the Court need not engage in a harmless error analysis. Rand, 154 F.3d at 961. The Ninth Circuit, however, recognizes "that there may be the unusual case where the harmlessness of the failure to give the required notice may be established on the record or by judicial notice." Id. Examples of such cases may be where the Court could take judicial notice that the plaintiff had recently been ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.