United States District Court, D. Montana, Missoula Division
JOANNA M. SNYDER, Petitioner,
FLATHEAD COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, Respondent.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES
Jeremiah C. Lynch United States Magistrate Judge.
January 24, 2019, Petitioner Joanna Cook filed a petition
challenging her continued detention under a fugitive from
justice warrant issued by the State of Massachusetts.
See generally, (Doc. 1); see also, (Doc.
1-1 at 2.)
Court presumes, as a pretrial detainee, that Ms. Snyder seeks
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 28 U.S.C. §2241
"provides generally for the granting of writs of habeas
corpus by federal courts, implementing 'the general grant
of habeas authority provided by the Constitution.'"
Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735
(9thCir. 2008 (en banc) (quoting White v.
Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2004).
Section 2241 provides the authority for granting habeas
relief to a person "who is not in custody pursuant to a
state court judgment" but, rather, who is in custody for
some other reason, such a pretrial detention or awaiting
extradition. White, 370 F.3d at 1006. For the reasons
explained below, Snyder's petition should be dismissed
for failure to exhaust.
Courts are authorized by 28 U.S.C. §2241 to consider
petitions for habeas corpus." Castro-Cortez v.
INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001),
abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez-Bargas v.
Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006). "That section does
not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct
appeals before filing petitions for habeas corpus."
Id. The Ninth Circuit, however, "require[s], as
a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust
available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking
relief under §2241." Id.
Montana Legislature has specifically outlined the judicial
procedure an accused individual is to utilize when
challenging an arrest pursuant an extrajudicial warrant:
If the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel states that the
prisoner or the prisoner and counsel desire to test the
legality of the prisoner's arrest, the judge of the court
of record shall fix a reasonable time to be allowed the
prisoner within which to apply for a writ of habeas corpus.
When the writ is applies for, notice of the writ and of the
time and place of the hearing on the writ must be given to
the prosecuting officer of the county in which the arrest was
made and in which the accused is in custody and to the agent
of the demanding state.
Code. Ann. §46-30-217. Additionally, Snyder may file a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus as an original
proceeding with the Montana Supreme Court. See e.g.,
MCA §46-22-202(1); see also, Thomas v.
Doe, 2011 MT 283, ¶6, 362 Mont. 454, 266 P.3d 1255.
exhaustion requirement under Section 2241 may be waived or
excused in certain circumstances, including: where the remedy
provides no genuine opportunity for adequate relief, or
pursuit of the remedy would be futile; irreparable injury
might occur without immediate judicial relief; the remedial
proceedings would be void; or some instances of a complaining
party's raising a substantial constitutional question.
Liang v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000-1001
(9th Cir. 1994).
of the state court docket reflects that Ms. Snyder has not
attempted to follow the procedure outlined in MCA
§46-30-217 to challenge her arrest. Likewise, the
Montana Supreme Court docket reveals Snyder has not initiated
an original habeas action. Nor has Snyder established that the
state judicial procedures available to her are futile or that
irreparable injury will occur without this Court's
intervention. Additionally, it appears that the fugitive from
justice warrant is not be the only reason for her current
custody. Snyder has ongoing state criminal proceedings.
See, (Doc. 1-1 at 1) (memo from Officer Marvin
advising that on 11/21/18 Snyder was served with a warrant
for violating the conditions of her release on a Deceptive
Practices charge in Cause No. DC-16-492A).
has not provided a legal or factual basis for her failure to
challenge the Massachusetts warrant in the state courts.
Accordingly, Snyder's failure to exhaust her judicial
remedies under §2241 warrants dismissal of her petition.
Dismissal should be without prejudice, allowing Snyder to
return to this Court if and when she exhausts her state
Certificate of Appealability
district court must issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the
applicant." Rule 11(a), Rules governing § 2254
Proceedings. A COA should issue as to those claims on which a
petitioner makes a "substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
The standard is satisfied if "jurists of reason could
disagree with the district court's resolution of [the]
constitutional claims" or "conclude the issues
presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
327 (2003) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
claims Snyder attempts to advance does not make a substantial
showing that she was deprived of a constitutional right.
Further, because Snyder has not exhausted available judicial
remedies, reasonable jurists ...