Submitted on Briefs: April 10, 2019
FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, In
and For the County of Rosebud, Cause No. DC 1533 Honorable
Nickolas C. Murnion, Presiding Judge
Appellant: Matthew Lawrence Gram, Self-Represented
Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Madison
L. Mattioli, Assistant Attorney General
Kristine White, Rosebud County Attorney
Jeremiah Shea, Justice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Jeremiah Shea, Justice.
Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court
Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum
opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as
precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition
shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of
noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and
Matthew Lawrence Gram appeals the Order of the Sixteenth
Judicial District Court, Rosebud County, denying his Motion
to Stop Department of Corrections Garnishment of 
Gram's Inmate Trust Account (Motion). We affirm.
On August 7, 1985, Gram pled guilty to felony criminal
mischief, in violation of § 45-6-101, MCA (1978). On
August 29, 1985, the District Court sentenced Gram to five
years, with all but thirty days suspended. As a condition of
his suspended sentence, Gram was ordered to pay $4, 123.32 in
restitution. On September 25, 1986, the State filed a Motion
to Revoke and a Report of Violation, alleging, among other
things, that Gram failed to make payments on the restitution
ordered. On October 2, 1986, the District Court revoked
Gram's suspended sentence and sentenced him to five years
at the Montana State Prison (MSP), with credit for time
served. On or about September 2, 1991, Gram's sentence on
the criminal mischief charge expired. Since 2004, Gram has
been in and out of confinement at MSP for unrelated offenses,
and Gram's inmate trust account at MSP has been garnished
to pay the owed restitution since 2010. On September 17,
2018, Gram filed his Motion pro se, alleging that the State
was illegally garnishing his inmate trust account at MSP and
his Montana State income tax refund to pay the restitution.
On September 18, 2018, the District Court denied Gram's
Motion. Gram appeals.
We review a district court's denial of a postconviction
relief (PCR) petition to determine whether its findings of
fact are clearly erroneous and its conclusions of law are
correct. Wilkes v. State, 2015 MT 243, ¶ 9, 380
Mont. 388, 355 P.3d 755 (citation omitted). We will not
reverse where the district court reached the right result,
even if it reaches the right result for the wrong reason.
State v. Ellison, 2012 MT 50, ¶ 8, 364 Mont.
276, 272 P.3d 646 (citation omitted).
PCR remains the exclusive remedy for collaterally attacking
the validity of a conviction and sentence. Section 46-21-101,
MCA. To determine whether a PCR petition is timely, we look
to the statute of limitations in effect at the time the PCR
petition is filed, not to the statute in effect at the time
of the conviction. Hawkins v. Mahoney, 1999 MT 82,
¶ 9, 294 Mont. 124, 979 P.2d 697 (citations omitted). A
PCR petition may be filed at any time within one year of the
date that the conviction becomes final. Section 46-21-102(1),
MCA. A conviction becomes final for purposes of PCR when the
time for appeal to this Court expires. Section
Here, the District Court analyzed the merits of Gram's
Motion, treating it as a request to modify the judgment.
However, Gram's Motion, although not styled as such, is
functionally a PCR petition. See § 46-21-101,
MCA. Gram's revoked sentence on his criminal mischief
conviction became final when his time for appeal to this
Court expired. See § 46-21-102(1)(a), MCA;
see also M. R. App. P. 4(5)(b). Gram was required to
file his Motion as a PCR petition within one year of his
conviction becoming final. See § 46-21-102(1),
MCA. Gram's Motion was filed thirty-three years after his
original sentence was imposed and thus is time barred.
See § 46-21-102(1)(a), MCA; Hawkins
¶ 9. Accordingly, we decline to address the merits of
Gram's Motion. The District Court correctly denied
Gram's Motion, albeit for the wrong reason. See
Ellison, ¶ 8.
We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I,
Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which
provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law