February 26, 2019
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE TENTH CIRCUIT No. 17-1672.
Andre Haymond was convicted of possessing child pornoaphy, a
crime that carries a prison term of zero to 10 years. After
serving a prison sentence of 38 months, and while on
supervised release, Mr. Haymond was again found with what
appeared to be child pornography. The government sought to
revoke his supervised release and secure a new and additional
prison sentence. A district judge, acting without a jury,
found by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Haymond
knowingly downloaded and possessed child pornography. Under
18 U.S.C. §3583(e)(3), the judge could have sentenced
him to a prison term of between zero and two additional
years. But because possession of child pornography is an
enumerated offense under §3583(k), the judge instead
imposed that provision's 5-year mandatory minimum. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit observed that whereas a jury had
convicted Mr. Haymond beyond a reasonable doubt of a crime
carrying a prison term of zero to 10 years, this new prison
term included a new and higher mandatory minimum resting on
facts found only by a judge by a preponderance of the
evidence. The Tenth Circuit therefore held that §3583(k)
violated the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments.
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded. 869 F.3d
1153, vacated and remanded.
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice
So-TOMAYOR, and JUSTICE Kagan, concluded that the application
of §3583(k) in this case violated Mr. Haymond's
right to trial by jury. Pp. 5-22.
(a) As at the time of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments'
adoption, a judge's sentencing authority derives from,
and is limited by, the jury's factual findings of
criminal conduct. A jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt
every fact" 'which the law makes essential to [a]
punishment'" that a judge might later seek to
impose. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304.
Historically, that rule's application proved
straightforward, but recent legislative innovations have
raised difficult questions. In Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, for example, this Court held
unconstitutional a sentencing scheme that allowed a judge to
increase a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory
maximum based on the judge's finding of new facts by a
preponderance of the evidence. And in Alleyne v. United
States, 570 U.S. 99, the Court held that
Apprendi's principle "applies with equal
force to facts increasing the mandatory minimum." 570
U.S., at 111-112. The lesson for this case is clear: Based
solely on the facts reflected in the jury's verdict, Mr.
Haymond faced a lawful prison term of between zero and 10
years. But just like the facts the judge found at the
defendant's sentencing hearing in Alleyne, the
facts the judge found here increased "the legally
prescribed range of allowable sentences" in violation of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Id., at 115. Pp.
(b) The government's various replies are unpersuasive.
First, it stresses that Alleyne arose in a different
procedural posture, but this Court has repeatedly rejected
efforts to dodge the demands of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments by the simple expedient of relabeling a criminal
prosecution. And this Court has already recognized that
punishments for revocation of supervised release arise from
and are "treat[ed] ... as part of the penalty for the
initial offense." Johnson v. United States, 529
U.S. 694, 700. Because a defendant's final sentence
includes any revocation sentence he may receive,
§3583(k)'s 5-year mandatory minimum mirrors the
unconstitutional sentencing enhancement in Alleyne.
Second, the government suggests that Mr. Haymond's
sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release
was actually fully authorized by the jury's verdict,
because his supervised release was from the outset always
subject to the possibility of judicial revocation and
§3583(k)'s mandatory prison sentence. But what is
true in Apprendi and Alleyne can be no less
true here: A mandatory minimum 5-year sentence that comes
into play only as a result of additional judicial
factual findings by a preponderance of the evidence cannot
stand. Finally, the government contends that
§3583(k)'s supervised release revocation procedures
are practically identical to historic parole and probation
revocation procedures, which have usually been understood to
comport with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. That argument
overlooks a critical difference between §3583(k) and
traditional parole and probation practices. Where parole and
probation violations traditionally exposed a de- fendant only
to the remaining prison term authorized for his
crime of conviction, §3583(k) exposes a defendant to an
additional mandatory minimum prison term
beyond that authorized by the jury's verdict-
all based on facts found by a judge by a mere preponderance
of the evidence. Pp. 11-18.
(c) The Tenth Circuit may address on remand the question
whether its remedy-declaring the last two sentences of
§3583(k) "unconstitutional and
unenforceable"-sweeps too broadly, including any
question concerning whether the government's argument to
that effect was adequately preserved. Pp. 22-23.
JUSTICE BREYER agreed that the particular provision at issue,
18 U.S.C. §3583(k), is unconstitutional. Three features
of §3583(k), considered together, make it less like
ordinary supervised-release revocation and more like
punishment for a new offense, to which the jury right would
typically attach. First, §3583(k) applies only when a
defendant commits a discrete set of criminal offenses
specified in the statute. Second, §3583(k) takes away
the judge's discretion to decide whether violation of the
conditions of supervised release should result in
imprisonment and for how long. Third, §3583(k) limits
the judge's discretion in a particular manner: by
imposing a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of
"not less than 5 years" upon a judge's finding
that a defendant has committed a listed offense. But because
the role of the judge in a typical supervised-release
proceeding is consistent with traditional parole and because
Congress clearly did not intend the supervised release system
to differ from parole in this respect, JUSTICE BREYER would
not transplant the Apprendi line of cases to the
supervised-release context. Pp. 1-3.
GORSUCH, J., announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion, in which GlNSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and
KAGAN, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring
in the judgment. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.
jury, acting on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, may take a
person's liberty. That promise stands as one of the
Constitution's most vital protections against arbitrary
government. Yet in this case a congressional statute
compelled a federal judge to send a man to prison for a
minimum of five years without empaneling a jury of his peers
or requiring the government to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. As applied here, we do not hesitate to hold
that the statute violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
jury found Andre Haymond guilty of possessing child
pornography in violation of federal law, the question turned
to sentencing. The law authorized the district judge to
impose a prison term of between zero and 10 years, 18 U.S.C.
§2252(b)(2), and a period of supervised release of
between 5 years and life, §3583(k). Because Mr. Haymond
had no criminal history and was working to help support his
mother who had suffered a stroke, the judge concluded that
Mr. Haymond was "not going to get much out of being in
prison" and sentenced him to a prison term of 38 months,
followed by 10 years of supervised release.
completing his prison sentence, however, Mr. Haymond
encountered trouble on supervised release. He sat for
multiple polygraph tests in which he denied possessing or
viewing child pornography, and each time the test indicated
no deception. But when the government conducted an
unannounced search of his computers and cellphone, it turned
up 59 images that appeared to be child pornography. Based on
that discovery, the government sought to revoke Mr.
Haymond's supervised release and secure a new and
additional prison sentence.
hearing followed before a district judge acting without a
jury, and under a preponderance of the evidence rather than a
reasonable doubt standard. In light of expert testimony
regarding the manner in which cellphones can
"cache" images without the user's knowledge,
the judge found insufficient evidence to show that Mr.
Haymond knowingly possessed 46 of the images. At the same
time, the judge found it more likely than not that Mr.
Haymond knowingly downloaded and possessed the remaining 13
that, the question turned once more to sentencing. Under 18
U.S.C. §3583(e)(3), enacted as part of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, a district judge who finds that a
defendant has violated the conditions of his supervised
release normally may (but is not required to) impose a new
prison term up to the maximum period of supervised release
authorized by statute for the defendant's original crime
of conviction, subject to certain limits. Under that
provision, the judge in this case would have been free to
sentence Mr. Haymond to between zero and two additional years
there was a complication. Under §3583(k), added to the
Act in 2003 and amended in 2006, if a judge finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that a defendant on supervised
release committed one of several enumerated offenses,
including the possession of child pornography, the judge
must impose an additional prison term of at least
five years and up to life without regard to the length of the
prison term authorized for the defendant's initial crime
Mr. Haymond had committed an offense covered by
§3583(k), the judge felt bound to impose an additional
prison term of at least five years. He did so, though, with
reservations. It's one thing, Judge Terence Kern said,
for a judge proceeding under a preponderance of the evidence
standard to revoke a defendant's supervised release and
order him to serve additional time in prison within the range
already authorized by the defendant's original
conviction; after all, the jury's verdict, reached under
the reasonable doubt standard, permitted that much
punishment. But the judge found it
"'repugnant'" that a statute might impose a
new and additional "mandatory five-year" punishment
without those traditional protections. Were it not for
§3583(k)'s mandatory minimum, the judge added, he
"probably would have sentenced in the range of two years
appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Mr. Haymond challenged both the
factual support for his new punishment and its
constitutionality. On the facts, the court of appeals held
that the district court's findings against Mr. Haymond
were clearly erroneous in certain respects. Even so, the
court concluded, just enough evidence remained to sustain a
finding that Mr. Haymond had knowingly possessed the 13
images at issue, in violation of §3583(k). That left the
question of the statute's constitutionality, and there
the Tenth Circuit concluded that §3583(k) violated the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The court explained that a jury
had convicted Mr. Haymond beyond a reasonable doubt of a
crime carrying a prison term of zero to 10 years. Yet now Mr.
Haymond faced a new potential prison term of five years to
life. Because this new prison term included a new and higher
mandatory minimum resting only on facts found by a judge by a
preponderance of the evidence, the court held, the statute
violated Mr. Haymond's right to trial by jury.
of remedy, the court held the last two sentences of
§3583(k), which mandate a 5-year minimum prison term,
"unconstitutional and unenforceable." 869 F.3d
1153, 1168 (2017). The court then vacated Mr. Haymond's
revocation sentence and remanded the case to the district
court for resentencing without regard to those provisions. In
effect, the court of appeals left the district court free to
issue a new sentence under the preexisting statute governing
most every other supervised release violation, §3583(e).
Following the Tenth Circuit's directions, the district
court proceeded to resentence Mr. Haymond to time served, as
he had already been detained by that point for approximately
28 months. We granted review to consider the Tenth
Circuit's constitutional holding. 586 U.S.___ (2018).
with the right to vote, those who wrote our Constitution
considered the right to trial by jury "the heart and
lungs, the mainspring and the center wheel" of our
liberties, without which "the body must die; the watch
must run down; the government must become arbitrary."
Letter from Clarendon to W. Pym (Jan. 27, 1766), in 1 Papers
of John Adams 169 (R. Taylor ed. 1977). Just as the right to
vote sought to preserve the people's authority over their
government's executive and legislative functions, the
right to a jury trial sought to preserve the people's
authority over its judicial functions. J. Adams, Diary Entry
(Feb. 12, 1771), in 2 Diary and Autobiography of John Adams 3
(L. Butterfield ed. 1961); see also 2 J. Story, Commentaries
on the Constitution §1779, pp. 540-541 (4th ed. 1873).
that end, the Framers adopted the Sixth Amendment's
promise that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury." In the Fifth Amendment, they added that
no one may be deprived of liberty without "due process
of law." Together, these pillars of the Bill of Rights
ensure that the government must prove to a jury every
criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt, an ancient rule
that has "extend[ed] down centuries." Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000).
when does a "criminal prosecution" arise
implicating the right to trial by jury beyond a reasonable
doubt? At the founding, a "prosecution" of an
individual simply referred to "the manner of [his]
formal accusation." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 298 (1769) (Blackstone); see also N. Webster,
An American Dictionary of the English Language (1st ed. 1828)
(defining "prosecution" as "the process of
exhibiting formal charges against an offender before a legal
tribunal"). And the concept of a "crime" was a
broad one linked to punishment, amounting to those "acts
to which the law affixes . . . punishment," or, stated
differently, those "element[s] in the wrong upon which
the punishment is based." 1 J. Bishop, Criminal
Procedure §§80, 84, pp. 51-53 (2d ed. 1872)
(Bishop); see also J. Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in
Criminal Cases *106 (5th Am. ed. 1846) (Arch-bold)
(discussing a crime as including any fact that "annexes
a higher degree of punishment"); Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 309 (2004); Apprendi,
530 U.S., at 481.
with these understandings, juries in our constitutional order
exercise supervisory authority over the judicial function by
limiting the judge's power to punish. A judge's
authority to issue a sentence derives from, and is limited
by, the jury's factual findings of criminal conduct. In
the early Republic, if an indictment or "accusation . .
. lack[ed] any particular fact which the laws ma[d]e
essential to the punishment," it was treated as "no
accusation" at all. 1 Bishop §87, at 55; see also 2
M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown *170 (1736); Archbold *106. And
the "truth of every accusation" that was brought
against a person had to "be confirmed by the unanimous
suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours." 4
Blackstone 343. Because the Constitution's guarantees
cannot mean less today than they did the day they were
adopted, it remains the case today that a jury must find
beyond a reasonable doubt every fact "'which the law
makes essential to [a] punishment'" that a judge
might later seek to impose. Blakely, 542 U.S., at
304 (quoting 1 Bishop §87, at 55).
much of our history, the application of this rule of jury
supervision proved pretty straightforward. At common law,
crimes tended to carry with them specific sanctions, and
"once the facts of the offense were determined by the
jury, the judge was meant simply to impose the prescribed
sentence." Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S.
99, 108 (2013) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks
and brackets omitted). Even when judges did enjoy discretion
to adjust a sentence based on judge-found aggravating or
mitigating facts, they could not "'swell the penalty
above what the law ha[d] provided for the acts
charged'" and found by the jury. Apprendi,
530 U.S., at 519 (THOMAS, J., concurring) (quoting 1 Bishop
§85, at 54); see also 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Law
§§933-934(1), p. 690 (9th ed. 1923) ("[T]he
court determines in each case what within the limits of
the law shall be the punishment" (emphasis added)).
In time, of course, legislatures adopted new laws allowing
judges or parole boards to suspend part (parole) or all
(probation) of a defendant's prescribed prison term and
afford him a period of conditional liberty as an "act of
grace," subject to revocation. Escoe v. Zerbst,
295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935); see Anderson v. Corall,
263 U.S. 193, 196-197 (1923). But here, too, the prison
sentence a judge or parole board could impose for a parole or
probation violation normally could not exceed the remaining
balance of the term of imprisonment already authorized by the
jury's verdict. So even these developments did not
usually implicate the historic concerns of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments. See Blakely, 542 U.S., at 309;
Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring);
4 Atty. Gen.'s Survey of Release Proc. 22 (1939); 2
id., at 333.
recent legislative innovations have raised harder questions.
In Apprendi, for example, a jury convicted the
defendant of a gun crime that carried a maximum prison
sentence of 10 years. But then a judge sought to impose a
longer sentence pursuant to a statute that authorized him to
do so if he found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the defendant had committed the crime with racial bias.
Apprendi held this scheme unconstitutional.
"[A]ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum," this Court
explained, "must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt" or admitted by the defendant.
530 U.S., at 490. Nor may a State evade this traditional
restraint on the judicial power by simply calling the process
of finding new facts and imposing a new punishment a judicial
"sentencing enhancement." Id., at 495.
"[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of
effect-does the required [judicial] finding expose the
defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the
jury's guilty verdict?" Id., at 494.
"trial practices ca[n] change in the course of centuries
and still remain true to the principles that emerged from the
Framers'" design, id., at 483, in the years
since Apprendi this Court has not hesitated to
strike down other innovations that fail to respect the
jury's supervisory function. See, e.g., Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (imposition of death
penalty based on judicial factfinding); Blakely, 542
U.S., at 303 (mandatory state sentencing guidelines);
Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007)
(same); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)
(mandatory federal sentencing guidelines); Southern Union
Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343 (2012) (imposition of
criminal fines based on judicial factfinding).
these decisions left an important gap. In Apprendi,
this Court recognized that "'[i]t is
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury
the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of
penalties.'" 530 U.S., at 490. But by definition, a
range of punishments includes not only a maximum but a
minimum. And logically it would seem to follow that any facts
necessary to increase a person's minimum punishment (the
"floor") should be found by the jury no less than
facts necessary to increase his maximum punishment (the
"ceiling"). Before Apprendi, however, this
Court had held that facts elevating the minimum punishment
need not be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986); see
also Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002)
(adhering to McMillan).
the Court confronted this anomaly in Alleyne. There,
a jury convicted the defendant of a crime that ordinarily
carried a sentence of five years to life in prison. But a
separate statutory "sentencing enhancement"
increased the mandatory minimum to seven years if the
defendant "brandished" the gun. At sentencing, a
judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant had indeed brandished a gun and imposed the
mandatory minimum 7-year prison term.
Court reversed. Finding no basis in the original
understanding of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments for
McMillan and Harris, the Court expressly
overruled those decisions and held that "the principle
applied in Apprendi applies with equal force to
facts increasing the mandatory minimum" as it does to
facts increasing the statutory maximum penalty.
Alleyne, 570 U.S., at 112. Nor did it matter to
Alleyne's analysis that, even without the
mandatory minimum, the trial judge would have been free to
impose a 7-year sentence because it fell within the statutory
sentencing range authorized by the jury's findings. Both
the "floor" and "ceiling" of a sentencing
range "define the legally prescribed penalty."
Ibid. And under our Constitution, when "a
finding of fact alters the legally prescribed punishment so
as to aggravate it" that finding must be made by a jury
of the defendant's peers beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id., at 114. Along the way, the Court observed that
there can be little doubt that "[e]levating the low end
of a sentencing range heightens the loss of liberty
associated with the crime: The defendant's expected
punishment has increased as a result of the narrowed range
and the prosecution is empowered, by invoking the mandatory
minimum, to require the judge to impose a higher punishment
than he might wish." Id., at 113 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
the lesson for our case is clear. Based on the facts
reflected in the jury's verdict, Mr. Haymond faced a
lawful prison term of between zero and 10 years under
§2252(b)(2). But then a judge-acting without a jury and
based only on a preponderance of the evidence-found that Mr.
Haymond had engaged in additional conduct in violation of the
terms of his supervised release. Under §3583(k), that
judicial factfinding triggered a new punishment in the form
of a prison term of at least five years and up to life. So
just like the facts the judge found at the defendant's
sentencing hearing in Alleyne, the facts the judge
found here increased "the legally prescribed range of
allowable sentences" in violation of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. Id., at 115. In this case, that meant
Mr. Haymond faced a minimum of five years in prison instead
of as little as none. Nor did the absence of a jury's
finding beyond a reasonable doubt only infringe the rights of
the accused; it also divested the "'people at
large'"-the men and women who make up a jury of a
defendant's peers-of their constitutional authority to
set the metes and bounds of judicially administered criminal
punishments. Blakely, 542 U.S., at 306 (quoting
Letter XV by the Federal Farmer (Jan. 18, 1788), in 2 The
Complete Anti-Federalist 315, 320 (H. Storing ed.
reply, the government and the dissent offer many and
sometimes competing arguments, but we find none persuasive.
government begins by pointing out that Alleyne arose
in a different procedural posture. There, the trial judge
applied a "sentencing enhancement" based on his own
factual findings at the defendant's initial sentencing
hearing; meanwhile, Mr. Haymond received his new punishment
from a judge at a hearing to consider the revocation of his
term of supervised release. This procedural distinction makes
all the difference, we are told, because the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial promise applies only to
"criminal prosecutions," which end with the
issuance of a sentence and do not extend to
"postjudgment sentence-administration proceedings."
Brief for United States 24; see also post, at 13-17
(ALITO, J., dissenting) (echoing this argument).
have been down this road before. Our precedents,
Apprendi, Blakely, and Alleyne included,
have repeatedly rejected efforts to dodge the demands of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments by the simple expedient of
relabeling a criminal prosecution a "sentencing
enhancement." Calling part of a criminal prosecution a
"sentence modification" imposed at a
"postjudgment sentence-administration proceeding"
can fare no better. As this Court has repeatedly explained,
any "increase in a defendant's authorized punishment
contingent on the finding of a fact" requires a jury and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt "no matter" what
the government chooses to call the exercise. Ring,
536 U.S., at 602.
sure, and as the government and dissent emphasize,
founding-era prosecutions traditionally ended at final
judgment. But at that time, generally, "questions of
guilt and punishment both were resolved in a single
proceeding" subject to the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment's demands. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth
Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105 Colum. L. Rev.
1967, 2011 (2005); see also supra, at 7. Over time,
procedures changed as legislatures sometimes bifurcated
criminal prosecutions into separate trial and penalty phases.
But none of these developments licensed judges to sentence
individuals to punishments beyond the legal limits fixed by
the facts found in the jury's verdict. See ibid.
To the contrary, we recognized in Apprendi and
Alleyne, a "criminal prosecution"
continues and the defendant remains an "accused"
with all the rights provided by the Sixth Amendment, until a
final sentence is imposed. See Apprendi, 530 U.S.,
we merely acknowledge that an accused's final sentence
includes any supervised release sentence he may receive. Nor
in saying that do we say anything new: This Court has already
recognized that supervised release punishments arise from and
are "treat[ed] ... as part of the penalty for the
initial offense." Johnson v. United States, 529
U.S. 694, 700 (2000). The defendant receives a term of
supervised release thanks to his initial offense, and whether
that release is later revoked or sustained, it constitutes a
part of the final sentence for his crime. As at the initial
sentencing hearing, that does not mean a jury must find every
fact in a revocation hearing that may affect the judge's
exercise of discretion within the range of punishments
authorized by the jury's verdict. But it does mean that a
jury must find any facts that trigger a new
mandatory minimum prison term.
logic respects not only our precedents, but the original
meaning of the jury trial right they seek to protect. The
Constitution seeks to safeguard the people's control over
the business of judicial punishments by ensuring that any
accusation triggering a new and additional punishment is
proven to the satisfaction of a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. By contrast, the view the government and dissent
espouse would demote the jury from its historic role as
"circuitbreaker in the State's machinery of
justice," Blakely, 542 U.S., at 306, to
"'low-level gatekeeping, '"
Booker, 543 U.S., at 230. If the government and
dissent were correct, Congress could require anyone convicted
of even a modest crime to serve a sentence of supervised
release for the rest of his life. At that point, a judge
could try and convict him of any violation of the terms of
his release under a preponderance of the evidence standard,
and then sentence him to pretty much anything. At oral
argument, the government even conceded that, under its
theory, a defendant on supervised release would have no Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial when charged with an
infraction carrying the death penalty. We continue to doubt
whether even Apprendi's fiercest critics
"would advocate" such an "absurd result."
Blakely, 542 U.S., at 306.
it previously suggested that Mr. Haymond's supervised
release revocation proceeding was entirely divorced from his
criminal prosecution, the government next turns around and
suggests that Mr. Haymond's sentence for violating the
terms of his supervised release was actually fully authorized
by the jury's verdict. See also post, at 7-8
(ALITO, J., dissenting) (proposing a similar theory). After
all, the government observes, on the strength of the
jury's findings the judge was entitled to impose as
punishment a term of supervised release; and, in turn, that
term of supervised release was from the outset always subject
to the possibility of judicial revocation and
§3583(k)'s mandatory prison sentence. Presto: Sixth
Amendment problem solved.
have been down this road too. In Apprendi and
Alleyne, the jury's verdict triggered a statute
that authorized a judge at sentencing to increase the
defendant's term of imprisonment based on judge-found
facts. This Court had no difficulty rejecting that scheme as
an impermissible evasion of the historic rule that a jury
must find all of the facts necessary to authorize a
judicial punishment. See Alleyne, 570 U.S., at 117;
Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 483. And what was true there
can be no less true here: A mandatory minimum 5-year sentence
that comes into play only as a result of additional
judicial factual findings by a preponderance of the evidence
cannot stand. This Court's observation that
"postrevocation sanctions" are "treat[ed] ...
as part of the penalty for the initial offense,"
Johnson, 529 U.S., at 700, only highlights the
constitutional infirmity of §3583(k): Treating Mr.
Haymond's 5-year mandatory minimum prison term as part of
his sentence for his original offense makes clear that it
mirrors the unconstitutional sentencing enhancement in
Alleyne. See supra, at 12-13.
too, that following the government down this road would lead
to the same destination as the last: If the government were
right, a jury's conviction on one crime would (again)
permit perpetual supervised release and allow the government
to evade the need for another jury trial on any other offense
the defendant might commit, no matter how grave the
punishment. And if there's any doubt about the incentives
such a rule would create, consider this case. Instead of
seeking a revocation of supervised release, the government
could have chosen to prosecute Mr. Haymond under a statute
mandating a term of imprisonment of 10 to 20 years for repeat
child-pornography offenders. 18 U.S.C. §2252(b)(2). But
why bother with an old-fashioned jury trial for a new crime
when a quick-and-easy "supervised release revocation
hearing" before a judge carries a penalty of five years
to life? This displacement of the jury's traditional