KEITH E. DOYLE, Petitioner,
PAT McTIGHE, WARDEN, CROSSROADS CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Respondent.
E. Doyle petitions this Court for habeas corpus relief,
challenging his felony conviction from the Second Judicial
District Court, Butte-Silver Bow County. Doyle attaches
several documents to his petition, including a copy of his
recently denied petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed
in the United States Supreme Court. In re Doyle,
___U.S.___, 139 S.Ct. 1235 (Feb. 19, 2019).
January 2005, a jury found Doyle guilty of deliberate
homicide by accountability. The District Court sentenced him
to sixty-five years in Montana State Prison. Doyle appealed.
State v. Doyle, 2007 MT 125, 337 Mont. 308, 160 P.3d
316 (Doyle I). One of the issues raised on appeal
was whether "sufficient evidence exist[ed] to support
Doyle's conviction of deliberate homicide by
accountability." Doyle I, ¶¶ 5,
52-69. This Court affirmed the District Court.
sought postconviction relief in the District Court in October
2007. The District Court dismissed the petition as
procedurally barred. Doyle appealed. Doyle v. State, No.
DA 08-0218, 2009 MT 105N, 2009 Mont. LEXIS 114 (Doyle
III). We noted that Doyle "raised numerous claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), each based on
evidentiary issues that were raised in his appeal."
Doyle III, ¶ 4. We affirmed the District
Court's decision, denying Doyle's petition for
postconviction relief, because "Doyle's IAC claims
are comprised entirely of conclusory allegations that do not
constitute evidence establishing the existence of facts that
support grounds for relief. See §
46-21-lO4(1)(c), MCA[.]" Doyle III, ¶ 9
(other citations omitted). We concluded that "[t]he IAC
claims as pled, do not comply with the procedural
prerequisites required by § 46-21-lO4(1)(c), MCA. It is
manifest on the face of the briefs and the record that the
remaining claims are procedurally barred." Doyle
III, ¶ 12.
2013, Doyle filed two petitions for a writ of habeas corpus
with this Court. Doyle argued that he was deprived of a fair
trial before an impartial tribunal; that the presiding Judge
should have recused himself after granting leave to file the
information, and that his conviction and sentence are
"void." Doyle v. Frink, No. OP 13-0290,
Order (Mont. Jun. 5, 2013) (Doyle IV). We denied his
petition, pointing out that because he had exhausted his
appeal rights, habeas corpus was not available to challenge
the conviction's validity. Section 46-22-101(1), MCA.
This Court observed that Doyle's second petition for
habeas corpus relief raised the same grounds. Doyle v.
Frink, No. OP 13-0325, Order (Mont. Jun. 5, 2013)
(Doyle V). We denied the petition as moot because
the prior Order disposed of any remaining controversy.
2015, Doyle filed another petition for postconviction relief
in the Butte-Silver Bow County District Court. The court
denied his petition as untimely. Doyle appealed. Doyle v.
State, 2017 MT 9ON, 388 Mont. 553, 392 P.3d 613 (table)
(Doyle VI). This Court pointed out that Doyle sought
postconviction relief in the District Court in 2013, but he
did not appeal that decision. Doyle VI, ¶ 2. We
also noted Doyle's prior petitions for habeas corpus
relief with this Court in 2008 and 2013, and "habeas
corpus is not available to attack the validity of a
conviction of a person who has been adjudged guilty of an
offense and exhausted the remedy of appeal." Doyle
VI, ¶ 2, n.3 (citations omitted). We explained that
Doyle was procedurally barred to raise these claims in his
third petition for postconviction relief because his judgment
became final several years prior. Sections 46-21-105(1)(b),
46-21-205(2), and 46-21-102(1), MCA. We affirmed the District
instant petition, Doyle raises three grounds for relief.
Doyle contends that his prosecution's commencement should
have been by a grand jury or preliminary hearing and not by
the court granting leave to file an information. Citing to
Montana case law, he next argues that he could not be found
guilty of deliberate homicide by accountability because he
was not found guilty of deliberate homicide. Demontiney
v. Twelfth Judicial Dist. Ct, 2002 MT 161, 310 Mont.
406, 51 P.3d 476. Lastly, Doyle resurrects claims against his
trial counsel for alleged failures about his criminal
prosecution and resulting conviction. Doyle seeks relief:
dismissal of his conviction and his release.
Court has heard these arguments before from Doyle. His first
ground fails because he is not entitled to the commencement
of prosecution as he puts forth. Doyle IV. We held
in State v. Montgomery, 2015 MT 151, ¶ 11, 379
Mont. 353, 350 P.3d 77, that the "Montana statute
provides 'three different procedures by which the State
can obtain the requisite probable cause determination before
filing charges in district court[.]'" (internal
citations omitted). "[A] defendant is not entitled to
any specific procedure." Montgomery, ¶ 11
(citations omitted). We addressed his second ground squarely
in his first appeal. Doyle I, ¶¶ 55-62.
"The plain language of § 45-2-303, MCA, provides
that a person may be convicted for accountability only
'upon proof that the offense was committed . . .
.'" Doyle I, ¶ 62 (emphasis in
original). Doyle has raised or attempted to raise claims of
IAC in his cases with this Court, which we have denied.
Doyle III and Doyle VI.
is not entitled to habeas corpus relief or his release on the
grounds presented. Section 46-22-101(1), MCA. We have
informed Doyle before that habeas corpus relief is not
available to attack one's conviction after exhaustion of
his appeal rights. Doyle II, Doyle III, Doyle IV, Doyle
V, and Doyle VI. Doyle presents the same issues
that this Court has addressed since 2008. Pursuant to the
doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion, Doyle is barred
from re-litigating these issues even in a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. Montgomery, ¶ 11 (citations
omitted). Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that Doyle's Petition
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED and DISMISSED.
FURTHER ORDERED that henceforth, prior to filing any original
petition challenging his 2005 conviction and sentence with
this Court, Doyle is directed to file a motion for leave to
file the petition. The motion must be sworn under oath before
a notary public, not exceed three pages in length, and make a
preliminary showing that the motion has merit and meets the
criteria to state a prima facie case under M. R. App. P.
14(5). Only when this Court has reviewed the motion and
issued an order granting leave to file may the Clerk of this
Court file the petition. Any other original petition that
Doyle seeks to file shall be rejected forthwith, and the
Clerk shall inform Doyle accordingly.
Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Order to counsel
of record and to Keith E. Doyle, along with a copy of M. R.
App. P. 14(5), for his reference.
 While Doyle's postconviction
appeal was pending, he also filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, maintaining various claims concerning his
attorneys' failures before and during his trial. We
denied it, citing his pending appeal. Doyle v. O