United States District Court, D. Montana, Missoula Division
Jeremiah C. Lynch, United States Magistrate Judge.
Kenneth Flynn, appearing pro se, filed a motion requesting
that I, as the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge,
recuse myself from presiding over this action. Flynn
perceives that I am biased against him, but he relies only
upon the orders I have entered in this case. He complains
that on April 30, 2019, I entered an order denying his motion
to change venue for this action, and on June 10, 2019, I
entered an order denying his motion for appointment of
counsel to represent him.
Flynn does not identify the legal grounds for his motion, the
Court will liberally construing the motion as filed under
either 28 U.S.C. § 144, or 28 U.S.C. § 455. But for
the reasons discussed, the referenced orders denying
Flynn's motions are not grounds for recusal under either
28 U.S.C. § 144
extent Flynn's motion can be construed as filed under 28
U.S.C. § 144, he has not established that my
disqualification is warranted.
144 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes
and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge
before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or
prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse
party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but
another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding. [...
The party's affidavit] shall be accompanied by a
certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in
28 U.S.C. § 144.
certificate of good faith required under Section 144 must be
provided by a member of the bar, or the movant's counsel
of record. See Robinson v. Gregory, 929 F.Supp. 334,
337-38 (S.D. Ind. 1996). Consequently, a pro se litigant who
has not provided a certificate of good faith from a member of
the bar may not employ the disqualification procedures set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 144. Id. See also
Jimena v. UBS AG Bank, 2010 WL 2650714, *3 (E.D. Cal.
2010) and United States v. Briggs, 2007 WL 1364682,
*1 (D. Idaho 2007).
Flynn's motion is not accompanied by a certificate of
counsel, Section 144 does not provide a basis for my
28 U.S.C. § 455
extent Flynn's motion can be construed as seeking my
disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455, the motion must
455 is a self-executing disqualification statute. It provides
in relevant part as follows:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which